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Abstract
Web algorithms like Facebook’s so-called Edgerank algorithm play an
increasingly important  role in everyday life. The recent  surge of  research in
such algorithms of ten emphasizes algorithmic orderings as powerful but
opaque. In this essay, we propose an alternat ive reading of  the Edgerank
algorithm as a self -just if ying ordering of  the world. Drawing on the pragmat ist
sociology of  Boltanski and Thévenot , we examine Edgerank as not  just  a
hidden logic, but  a rhetor that  act ively const ructs a rhetorical commonplace
that  can be drawn upon in order to just if y the evaluat ions produced by the
algorithm. We do so by examining three specif ic situat ions where the
operat ions of  Edgerank have been crit iqued and defended: First , Facebook’s
own response to the crit ique that  social media produce echo chambers.
Second, Facebook’s presentat ion of  the main variables in the Edgerank
algorithm. Third, social media market ing blogs about  how to handle the
algorithm in pract ice. Based on these events, we const ruct  an ‘internalist ic’
account  of  the rhetoric of  Edgerank, opening for an explorat ion of  it s moral
grammar and the world or dwelling place it  assumes and enacts. We f ind that
the world of  Edgerank is ordered according to recent  engagement , which
means it  has af f init ies with what  Boltanski and Chiapello have termed the
connect ionist  world. At  the same t ime, the world of  Edgerank is marked by a
tension between authent icit y and automat ion that  is a result  of  the
algorithmic standardizat ion of  relat ions. In the rhetoric that  comes with
Edgerank, this tension is not  something to be overcome, but  rather a self -
just if ying hybrid, which points to a potent ial displacement  of  moral grammars
in an age of  computat ional valuat ion.
Introduction: From hidden power to explicit vision
Edgerank is an algorithm that  composes the sequence of  posts on a
Facebook user’s News Feed, which is the f irst  page one meets af ter logging in
to Facebook. The name and existence of  Edgerank is relat ively well known,
but  in comparison to Google’s Pagerank algorithm1, very lit t le research in the
social sciences and humanit ies has discussed Edgerank2. This is somewhat
surprising given the recent  surge in interest  in algorithms among researchers
in sof tware studies and beyond3, and the prominent  role that  Facebook now
plays in many areas of  everyday life.
The Edgerank algorithm, which we will present  and examine in detail soon,
specif ies how the algorithm does what  it  says it  does: ranks relat ionships
(‘edges’) between content  and users, in order to decide which posts should
show up on the news feeds of  individual users. When a chunk of  content  is
priorit ized by Facebook, it  is because this content  is being interacted with in
way that  the Edgerank algorithm picks up on. One way to understand
Edgerank is to emphasize the power that  seems to come with this posit ion.
Edgerank gets to make decisions about  how Facebook users are informed
about  their social networks.
What  is even more t roubling for some is that  this curat ion of  the lifeworld of
billions seems to work in the shadows. While Facebook presented a public
version of  Edgerank back in 2010, the company also st resses how the
algorithm that  is actually at  work is much more sophist icated and constant ly
being opt imized further through experimentat ion. The recent  cont roversy
around Facebook’s experiments with changing users’ exposure to posit ive
and negat ive content  is one example of  the fact  that  Facebook’s algorithms
cannot  be expected to be neither stable nor t ransparent4.
Based on these observat ions, there seems to be a task for crit ical social
science to see algorithms as part  of  the so-called ’technologically
unconscious’5, and reveal – or at  least  crit ique – their hidden power. One way
to interrogate so-called web 2.0 algorithms like Edgerank, then, is to
understand them as being at  the foref ront  of  the insert ion of  new kinds of
power in everyday socialit y6. An alternat ive st rategy, however, is to t race how
technologies are explicit ly assigned with normat ive capacit ies7. Such a
st rategy, we propose, might  supplement  our understanding of  the Edgerank
algorithm in interest ing ways.
To pursue this quest ion, we draw on French pragmat ist  sociology. For several
decades now, authors like Luc Boltanski and Laurent  Thévenot  have
developed an approach that  insists on the moral competencies of  ordinary
actors in everyday situat ions. In very general terms, the approach might  be
understood as a shif t  f rom crit ical sociology towards a sociology of  crit ique
and just if icat ion. Drawing on the work of  Boltanski and Thévenot8, we start
f rom the observat ion that  any ordering calls for a just if icat ion. It  follows that
when the Edgerank algorithm orders events for billions of  users, there is
immediately a quest ion raised about  how and why these orderings are
just if ied. Instead of  intervening with our own crit iques, which would be external
to Facebook and Edgerank, our st rategy is to shed light  on the various ways in
which the orderings of  Edgerank are already being crit iqued and just if ied. The
fact  that  web algorithms like Edgerank of fer orderings that  we encounter on a
regular basis means many actors are already challenged to relate explicit ly to
the algorithm. In this paper we interrogate some of  these encounters as doing
just if icat ion work related to Edgerank, which makes them a source for a more
‘internalist ic’ account  of  Edgerank.
The result  is an approach to the Edgerank algorithm where it  is no longer a
hidden and indefensible mechanism for prof it ing on the social act ivit y of
Facebook users, but  rather posit ioned as a specif ic response to specif ic
problems, such as the problem of  informat ion overload. As we shall see later,
Edgerank and the wider Facebook inf rast ructure seeks to f ilter and rank online
informat ion legit imately. With Boltanski and Thévenot , one would say that
Edgerank solves a problemat ic situat ion of  informat ion overload by of fering a
set  of  operat ional principles that  can be used to navigate the problem. The
quest ion then is: in relat ion to what  principle are these orderings just if ied? –
which also means asking what  kind of  rhetoric Edgerank makes possible and
relies on.
Producing an internalist ic account  of  how Edgerank is not  just  a powerful
ordering device, but  a self -just if ying one, relies on Boltanski and Thévenot ’s
challenge to the concept ion of  rhetoric as mere techné, which is the
understanding they f ind in Plato. In the Platonian understanding, rhetoric is
understood as the product ion of  persuasion and as something cont rary to
just ice 9. As an alternat ive, Boltanski and Thévenot  draw at tent ion to the
invent ive craf t  that  lies in const ruct ing apparent  t ruth, something that  is prior
to that  of  test ing it  10. This is what  we seek to do: Art iculate the apparent
t ruth proposed and enacted by the Edgerank algorithm, which allows us to
show how it  is constant ly subjected to tests and crit ique by various actors
instead of  test ing it  ourselves with external means.
This move relies on Boltanski and Thévenot ’s emphasis on rhetoric as the
const ruct ion of  commonplaces, drawing on Cicero. The concept  of
commonplace refers to a shared resource for underpinning arguments – a
source of  proofs and a reference point  for just if ying or crit icizing act ions. In
other words, we wish to resist  the temptat ion to ‘reveal’ the Edgerank
algorithm as an ef fect ive tool of  persuasion and governance of  Facebook
users, and instead examine it  as engaged in situated just if icat ion work.
Following Boltanski and Thévenot ’s understanding of  rhetoric, our st rategy is
to f lesh out  Edgerank’s work as a rhetor through interrogat ing crit ical
situat ions, where the just if iabilit y of  Edgerank is at  stake. In what  follows we
move through three such situat ions, act ively const ruct ing them as providing
explicat ions of  the rhetorical commonplace that  goes together with the
algorithm.
The f irst  empirical situat ion is the widespread crit ique that  Facebook due to
it s algorithmic orderings encloses public debate around current  events in
‘walled gardens’ or ‘echo chambers’. We rehearse two of  the most  prominent
voices in this discourse. We then highlight  the fact  that  Facebook has act ively
responded to this crit ique by, on their own terms, demonst rat ing how their
algorithmic orderings are just if iable.
As the second empirical event , we examine the specif icat ion of  the Edgerank
algorithm that  Facebook presented publicly in 2010. We take this as a chance
to f lesh out  the details of  the ‘moral grammar’ of  Edgerank11, including what
ent it ies exist  in this world, according to what  principles these beings are
assigned worth, and how evidence is produced.
In the third case, we invest igate the react ions to the presentat ion of  the
Edgerank algorithm in the community of  social media marketers. More
specif ically, we examine some of  the blog posts that  of fer advice about  how
to act  in a good way on web plat forms dominated by algorithms. We read
these blogs as of fering an explicat ion of  the pract ical wisdom of  those who
live in the world of  Edgerank.
This empirical take on the rhetoric of  an algorithm makes it  possible to draw
new connect ions between sof tware studies and studies in rhetoric. Whereas
the focus on rhetoric and the const ruct ion of  commonplaces puts emphasis
on discursive moves, sof tware studies prompts us to also pay at tent ion to
the socio-technical materialit y of  Edgerank’s existence, including the
Facebook interface and the concerns of  dif ferent  kinds of  Facebook users.
This combinat ion, we believe, might  of fer product ive ways to avoid the
technological determinism that  is implied by algorithms if  approached as
powerful technologies. To be sure, scholars within Science and Technology
Studies have long argued against  technological determinism and for a more
situat ional and dist ributed approaches. Such arguments are current ly being
taken up in relat ion to a specif ic focus on media 12, and this is where we
believe an analysis inspired by Boltanski and Thévenot  can cont ribute.
Drawing on Boltanski and Thévenot ’s theoret ical work, we set  out  to analyze
the world of  Edgerank enacted within a specif ic t ype of  social situat ion – a
crit ical situat ion where there is an imperat ive for just if icat ion. Our analysis is
intent ionally biased towards analyzing Edgerank within a moral register. This
of  course does not  mean that  Facebook does not  operate in many other
registers. Nor would it  suf f ice to analyze it s moral logic in order to account  for
Facebook as actor in social life or as a sphere of  social life. It  simply means
that  Facebook and the Edgerank algorithm also operate within a moral
register and on our moral registers – the fact  that  Facebook is a social and
polit ical navigat ion device for millions test if ies to this. To be clear, our aim is
not  to suggest  that  Facebook is morally good. No doubt , crit icism of
Facebook can be both t imely and called for. What  we propose is just  to pay
descript ive at tent ion to how ubiquitous algorithms like Facebook’s are already
being crit iqued and just if ied by various actors.
Edgerank as a self -justifying ordering of  current events
Edgerank and other web algorithms have of ten been crit iqued in a way that
focuses on how well they handle current  events and public concerns. The
just if icat ions with which these crit icisms have been met  are useful for
understanding how Edgerank and it s orderings can be made to seem fair.
Indeed, Boltanski and Thévenot  argue that  public situat ions put  special
pressure on actors to just if y their claims. One quite persistent  crit ique of
social media in general, and Facebook in part icular, has been that  they do not
order publics in a just if iable way, since they are part  of  the alleged creat ion of
‘echo chambers’, ‘f ilt er bubbles’ and ‘walled gardens’. Sunstein argues:
‘For aggregat ing informat ion, the Internet  of fers great  risk as well
as ext raordinary promise. Both the risk and the promise come
f rom the fact  that  with the Internet , it  is easy to obtain the views
and even the collaborat ion of  hundreds, thousands, and
conceivably even millions of  people. Every day, like-minded people
can and do sort  themselves into echo chambers of  their own
design, leading to wild errors, undue conf idence, and unjust if ied
ext remism. But  every day, the Internet  also of fers exceedingly
valuable exercises in informat ion aggregat ion, as people learn a
great  deal f rom the dispersed bits of  informat ion that  other
people have. Many people are curious, and they of ten seek out
perspect ives that  run counter to their own.’13
Sunstein establishes a dif ference between those who are ‘curious’ and those
who are less so. The lat ter squander the ‘ext raordinary promise’ of
informat ion aggregat ion on the web by closing themselves of f  in networks of
people similar to themselves, reducing the Internet  to something that  echoes
rather than challenges their opinions. While Sunstein focuses on the ‘errors’
and ‘undue conf idence’ that  such closed networks might  lead to, Pariser’s14
of fers a crit ique that  draws on solidarit y and democracy as resources under
threat :
‘Ult imately, democracy works only if  we cit izens are capable of
thinking beyond our narrow self -interest . But  to do so, we need a
shared view of  the world we cohabit . We need to come into
contact  with other peoples’ lives and needs and desires. The f ilter
bubble pushes us in the opposite direct ion—it  creates the
impression that  our narrow self -interest  is all that  exists. And while
this is great  for get t ing people to shop online, it ’s not  great  for
get t ing people to make bet ter decisions together. (…)
Personalizat ion has given us … a public sphere sorted and
manipulated by algorithms, f ragmented by design, and host ile to
dialogue’15
Here, Pariser assumes that  there is a clear-cut  divide between a market
sphere and a public sphere. In the former, personalizat ion is great , but  in the
lat ter it  is det rimental. Pariser points explicit ly to algorithms (including
Edgerank, on page 28) as manipulat ing the public sphere by connect ing people
and creat ing solidarit y. The algorithms f ilter out  that  which could challenge our
‘narrow self -interests’, the crit ique goes.
Reading these quotes, one might  quest ion the assumpt ion of  pre-exist ing
opinions that  are then merely ‘echoed’ on the web. However, what  is of
interest  here is how Facebook responded to these crit icisms. To a large
extent , Facebook accepted the premise of  the arguments made by Pariser
and Sunstein: That  networks closing themselves of f  are a thing to avoid.
Rather than simply reject ing the relevance of  this crit ique, Facebook carried
out  a study to prove the hypothesis wrong:
‘Some claim that  social networks act  like echo chambers in which
people only consume and share informat ion f rom likeminded close
f riends, st if ling the spread of  diverse informat ion. Our study paints
a dif ferent  picture of  the world.’16
Bakshy, an in-house Facebook data scient ist , and his colleagues carried out  a
f ield experiment  of  the kind that  only researchers internal to Facebook can
conduct . The experiment  enrolled in total 253 million unknowing Facebook
users as ‘subjects in situ’ to demonst rate that  those exposed to signals
about  their f riends’ informat ion sharing were more likely to share informat ion
than those not  exposed to such signals17. Crucial to the purpose of  reject ing
the echo chamber allegat ion, the paper claimed that  this demonst rated how
novel informat ion spread on Facebook with the help of  weak t ies, drawing on
Granovet ter’s18 classic paper:
‘…we found that  even though people are more likely to consume
and share informat ion that  comes f rom close contacts that  they
interact  with f requent ly (like discussing a photo f rom last  night ’s
party), the vast  majorit y of  informat ion comes f rom contacts that
they interact  with inf requent ly. These distant  contacts are also
more likely to share novel informat ion, demonst rat ing that  social
networks can act  as a powerful medium for sharing new ideas,
highlight ing new products and discussing current  events.’ 19
Here, Facebook’s researcher just if ies the world of  Edgerank by claiming that  it
operates exact ly in the opposite way of  echo chambers. What  makes
Facebook’s ordering device just if iable is that  it  af fords newness (new ideas,
new products, current  events) and engagement  (sharing, discussing). It  is
worth not ing that  Bakshy does not  part icularize the Facebook plat form as
something made for casual and non-polit ical act ivit y. Instead, Bakshy shows
how Facebook and it s network form can in fact  facilitate a just if iable mode of
discussion of  current  events. In other words, Bakshy does not  ret reat  to a
posit ion where social media cannot  do just ice to public concerns. At  the same
t ime, he defends Facebook’s orderings according to their own criteria of
connectedness. He does not  f ind it  important  to show the correctness of
informat ion on Facebook, which would answer Sunstein’s crit ique on it s own
premises of  avoiding error. Nor does Bakshy f ind it  relevant  to claim that
Facebook’s orderings can be said to represent  the general interest , which
would mean to answer Pariser’s crit ique on it s own premises of  solidarit y and
deliberat ion.
With Boltanski and Thévenot , it  becomes possible to see these crit iques and
responses not  as something that  can be solved, but  as rhetorical moves that
draw on dif ferent  and in this case incompat ible commonplaces. This is
possible through Boltanski and Thévenot ’s theory of  plural moral grammars
that  in their idealized forms of fer dif ferent  worlds in which specif ic
just if icat ions can be made. In On Justification, they const ruct  six such
grammars or ‘polit y models’ that  ‘gives direct ion to the ordinary sense of  what
is just ’20. These grammars all have some of  the same abst ract  features,
although they embody them in rather dif ferent  ways. The pluralit y includes a
civic moral grammar and an indust rial moral grammar that  can be used to
elaborate where the crit iques of  Pariser and Sunstein are coming f rom.
Pariser’s crit ique of  Edgerank as a device that  enhances unchallenged self -
interests is a classical crit ique f rom the civic grammar, because this grammar
is opposed to all that  personalizes. The civic grammar orders beings in
relat ion to their capacity to represent  the general interest  and requires actors
to leave their own interests and part icularit ies behind. Edgerank and the wider
Facebook inf rast ructure precisely does not  favor collect ive beings (states,
unions, etc.), but  personally engaged individuals. It  is telling that  Bakshy in no
way seeks to show how statements that  gain t ract ion on Facebook talks on
behalf  of  collect ives. What  mat ters to Bakshy is Edgerank’s abilit y to further
network act ivit y with people or things thereby engaging on a personal level
rather than t ranscending it .
Sunstein’s crit ique of  Edgerank as something that  gives rise to errors in
judgment  can be said to draw upon the indust rial grammar21. In this moral
grammar, things are worthy if  they have the capacity to know through
scient if ic methods and cont rol an external realit y. Websites like Wikipedia and
to a certain extent  Google might  answer to such criteria, but  Facebook’s
Bakshy does not  f ind it  relevant  to qualif y Edgerank with reference to it s
abilit y to f ilter out  false statements.
Facebook’s lack of  response to civic and indust rial crit iques raises the
quest ion of  how Edgerank can then handle current  events in a just if iable way,
now that  they have chosen not  to claim to provide the means for collect ive
judgment  or correct ly inform public debate. What  Bakshy (and Facebook)
does instead can be read as staying ‘within’ the world of  Edgerank, which
precisely sees recent  engagement  and the expansion of  network act ivit y as
valuable in it self . The expansion of  network act ivit y that  the Edgerank
algorithm and news feed is argued to facilitate is what  makes the social
network suitable for the discussion of  current  events.
Bakshy’s defense against  the f ilter bubble crit ique emphasizes how Edgerank
facilitates the expansion of  network act ivit y, by bringing distant  members of  a
network in contact  with one another – the qualit y of  bridging. Bakshy’s
defense of  Edgerank explicit ly uses the bridging abilit y of  the algorithm to
qualif y it  as a just if iable way of  mediat ing the discussion of  current  events.
This is an algorithmically produced vision of  how to order beings around a
Facebook user, including which ones to include and to exclude.
Following Boltanski and Thévenot , these examinat ions have allowed us to
take a f irst  step in specifying how Edgerank of fers a just  vision of  the public.
We have established that  it  is possible to defend Edgerank on it s own
grounds against  crit iques f rom other moral grammars. But  we have yet  to
invest igate the anatomy of  Edgerank as a moral grammar in it self . While
Facebook’s response to crit iques such as those f rom Pariser and Sunstein
suggests that  the orderings of  the Edgerank algorithm can provide a just
vision of  the public, Bakshy’s defense did not  f lesh out  how the algorithm
achieves the evaluat ions that  underlie this ordering.
The moral grammar of  the Edgerank algorithm
At  this point , the qualit ies used by Bakshy to just if y Edgerank in the face of
external crit iques point  to af f init ies between the moral grammar of  Edgerank
and the projective grammar, which is the moral grammar governing the so-
called connect ionist  world, as depicted by Boltanski and Chiapello22. Both
Edgerank and the project ive grammar sort  beings according to whether or not
they are act ive and foster act ivit y. They share the same ontological and
anthropological assumpt ions that  the world is made of  networks, that  things
exist  through their relat ions and that  all humans have a desire to connect .
Relevance in both cases is highly t ime specif ic and space specif ic (in a
network topology). The connect ionist  world changes too quickly for t radit ional
f igures like the Father, for instance, to have authorit y. It  is also too distributed
to assume such a thing as generally relevant  beings or general interest . One
must  keep on being act ive and engaging others. If  one is not  able to do so, it
is proof  of  a lack of  f lexibilit y, suggest ing that  one has been unable to adjust
to an ever changing world23.
This af f init y between the logic of  contemporary web algorithms and the
project ive world has already been taken up by Mager24. Drawing on Boltanski
and Chiapello’s argument  that  the genesis of  the project ive grammar
happened side by side with the format ion of  a new spirit  of  capitalism, Mager
suggests that  this spirit  plays a cent ral role for understanding ‘algorithmic
ideology’. She seeks to show how the new ‘capitalist  spirit  gets embedded in
search algorithms by way of  social pract ices’25.
We agree with Mager that  there is an interest ing connect ion between what
Boltanski and Chiapello call the connect ionist  world and the rise of  algorithms
that  handle, order and mediate our relat ions. But  our aim here is to invest igate
the Edgerank algorithm as an act ive rhetor, not  just  a carrier of  the new spirit
of  capitalism. We seek to keep the possibilit y open that  the project ive
grammar is not  just  embedded in the Edgerank algorithm, but  reappropriated
and altered by Edgerank. In order to pursue this aim we turn to another
empirical event  where the moral grammar of  Edgerank was specif ied further.
In 2010, Facebook engineers presented the Edgerank algorithm at  Facebook’s
‘f8’ conference. This is how it  was later reproduced on the technology news
site Tech Crunch26:
Figure 1, The EdgeRank formula as presented at Tech Crunch in 2010.
It  would of  course be problemat ic to interpret  this exact  algorithm as the
complete t ruth about  Edgerank. Indeed, the presentat ion of  the algorithm was
not  an at tempt  at  giving a community of  researchers insight  into the technical
details of  computat ion at  Facebook. But  it  does not  follow that  this publicly
available instant iat ion of  the algorithm has to be interpreted as ‘mere rhetoric’
in the sense of  an inst rumental move made by Facebook. The presentat ion at
the f8 conference was targeted at  people t rying to do business with
Facebook – in other words, people who – like social media marketers – were
t rying to f ind out  how to live with Facebook and it s algorithm. This means that
it  is possible to read the algorithm as a formulaic expression of  some of  the
key principles that  governs the world of  Edgerank. While Facebook is a very
mult ifaceted phenomenon, this specif icat ion of  the Edgerank algorithm can be
read as a consistent  formula that  makes it  possible to analyze it  as a moral
grammar.
What  is important  to this part  of  our invest igat ion is the tension within moral
grammars between equalit y, hierarchy and the common good. Any valuat ion
pract ice orders it s beings through some kind of  equivalency principle. To
just if y this hierarchy, the ordering has to invoke what  Boltanski and Thévenot
call a higher common principle, which is a principle that  aims at  making an
order acceptable because it  can be said to make the world a bet ter place for
both the superior and the inferior man. In our case what  we wish to do is to
analyze Edgerank as if it  were a moral grammar and t ry to get  a sense of  the
kind of  polit ical philosophy it  can be said to enact . That  is, in what  ‘world’ could
Edgerank be a just if iable way of  ordering beings? To do this we will ask some
of  the same quest ions to the Edgerank algorithm as Boltanski and Thévenot
ask in order to carve out  the dif ferent  worlds27.
a. What beings populate the Edgerank world and what are the states of worthiness?
The term beings here refers to the objects and subjects that  exist  within a
given world. These objects and subjects are recognized and valued to
dif ferent  degrees within a given world. The value of  beings determine and
just if y their posit ion, which is what  Boltanski and Thévenot  refer to as their
state of  worth. Asking these quest ions to the public version of  the Edgerank
algorithm presented above, the algorithm can be said to recognize edges, or
relat ions, between Facebook users and Facebook posts. As such, there are
three main kinds of  beings in the Edgerank world: Users (subjects), posts
(objects) and relat ionships (qualif iers). The relat ionships work as qualif iers in
the sense that  they determine to what  extent  the objects submit ted by
subjects should be visible (in the news feed), which is the expression of
worthiness in the world of  Edgerank.
A couple of  noteworthy things follow f rom this. First , subjects and objects only
come into existence through their relat ions with each other. A post  by a
Facebook user with no f riends does not  exist  in the world of  Edgerank, and
would not  be able to be displayed in the news feed, since it  has no worth at
all. As such, an object  (post ) with no subject  is unthinkable in the world of
Edgerank. A user with no f riends does not  exist ; objects can only be thought
of  as connected to specif ic subjects. Any object , any piece of  informat ion,
has to be qualif ied by social relat ions. In a sense, then, informat ion is
fundamentally ‘social’.
The same thing is t rue the other way around: A user with no relat ionships to
any posts cannot  show up in the news feed, since it  is based on relat ions. As
such, subjects without  objects are equally non-existent  in the world of
Edgerank. A Facebook f riendship relat ion that  is not  act ive, in the sense that  it
does not  create any objects, is hardly a relat ion at  all in the eyes of  Edgerank,
although it  would const itute an edge in general network analysis terms.
This algorithmic valuat ion of  engagement  dif fers f rom other ways of  ordering
relat ions between subjects. In a nat ion state, for instance, subject -subject
relat ions exact ly do not  have to involve engagement  with a common object ,
because subjects can be related through the category of  nat ionalit y, which
requires t ranscending their own personal af f iliat ions and talking on behalf  of
nat ional interests. In the world of  Edgerank, such a stabilizat ion of  relat ions is
hard to imagine, since the relat ions are by def init ion always provisory and
highly vulnerable to shif t s in recent  engagements. These observat ions align
well with the project  regime where activity is key28. The quest ion then is how
this act ivit y being valued by Edgerank more specif ically:
b. What are the higher common principles and the proper form of evidence in the
Edgerank world?
In order for actors to compare and order beings within a given situat ion, they
need a principle that  at  once makes comparison possible and ordering
just if iable. The evidence put  forth in order to assign worth needs to be
presented in an appropriate way, which complies with the world under
considerat ion29. For example, one cannot  present  rumors at  scient if ic
conferences, because other types of  evidence external to the subject  are
necessary.
The Edgerank formula specif ies three components of  the higher common
principle on which the algorithm bases it s ongoing evaluat ion work of  assigning
worthiness to objects (and the subjects connected with them). To start  f rom
the beginning of  the formula, the f irst  higher common principle is previous
interaction. An object  is deemed more worthy if  it  has the potent ial to connect
subjects that  have already engaged with each other. For example, if  a
Facebook user has previously exchanged messages with the user that  has
now engaged with a given post , that  post  will be more likely to show up in the
f irst  user’s news feed. The order of  worthiness expressed by the News Feed
is thus based on the principle that  the st rength of  exist ing social t ies
cont ributes to establishing a just  order. In establishing this ‘af f init y score’,
Edgerank does not  have to rely solely on what  is made visible through the
news feed. Other resources exist , such as the f requency of  chat  messages
between users, or even the f requency of  visit s to each other’s prof iles –
indicators of  engagement  that  are not  made visible through the news feed
governed by Edgerank, where subject -subject  relat ions mainly count  indirect ly.
The second higher common principle expressed in the Edgerank formula is the
depth of engagement. The quest ion that  Edgerank raises here is how a subject
engaged with an object : Did the user create the post , comment  on it , like it ,
share it , or tag someone in it? Facebook explicit ly states on it s help pages
that  it  considers visual content  more engaging than text , and that  get t ing
users to comment  is worth more than get t ing them to like something 30. Some
kinds of  engagement  are thus considered ‘deeper’ and worth more than
others. What  Edgerank seems to do here is to take the typology of  edges
built  into Facebook and perceive it  as a ladder of  engagement , where deeper
engagement  just if ies more visibilit y in the news feed.
As it s third and last  higher common principle, Edgerank values newness. From
the moment  where an edge is established, it  starts to ’decay’, and the longer
t ime that  passes, the less worthy of  appearance in the news feed the relat ion
becomes. Af ter the creat ion of  a post , any subsequent  engagement  with it ,
such as liking or comment ing, can renew the ‘f reshness’ of  the object . As such,
even old pieces of  content  should be able to appear in the news feed if  they
suddenly gain t ract ion in terms of  engagement . Linear t ime is thus not
assumed in any st rict  sense in the world of  Edgerank.
To sum up these three components, we can say that  Edgerank produces a
just  order of  relat ions between it s subjects and objects guided by the higher
common principle of  recent engagement (where depth of  engagement  with
both the subject (s) and the object (s) in the relat ionship being evaluated
counts). The other quest ion was about  the proper form of  evidence in the
world of  Edgerank. What  the three standardized variables make possible is
exact ly an ongoing algorithmic calculat ion that  then serves as the proper form
of  evidence that  propels a given being into a state of  worthiness. The last  set
of  quest ions then have to do with what  kinds of  situat ions are produced by
these orderings.
c. What are Edgerank’s harmonious figures of order, its natural relations, and its
appropriation in practice?
According to Boltanski and Thévenot , harmonious f igures of  order are the
realit ies that  ‘conform to the principle of  equity’ within a given world31. In the
connect ionist  world, the network is a harmonious f igure that  def ines the
realit ies that  form by encompassing the beings and dist ribut ions of  worth that
populate that  world. In a network the people who are engaged with others are
the most  valuable because they foster act ivit y, but  they also occupy a state
of  worth in that  they are connected. Similarly, in the Edgerank world, the
beings that  mat ter are those that  can engage their users. Even if  the
algorithm is opt imized and tweaked, there is reason to think that  these
changes do not  break with this basic test , because the purpose of  Edgerank
is exact ly to deliver engagement .
As a consequence, the Edgerank algorithm aims at  ordering it s beings so that
users are af fected. This is ref lected in a Facebook inf rast ructure that  seeks
to make engagement  possible by constant ly promot ing users to like, share
and comment . Following Boltanski and Thévenot , the natural relat ionship
between beings is expressed by the verbs most  common in the world under
scrut iny32. In the world of  Edgerank, the verbs ‘like’ and ‘share’ point  to
posit ive engagement  in networks as the natural relat ionship between ent it ies.
The act ions of  liking and sharing are in harmony with an equivalency principle
that  values engagement . The fact  that  to dislike or prevent from sharing are
not  possible act ions in Facebook reveals how Edgerank enacts a world where
engagement  is always a posit ive thing.
Here, it  becomes clear that  Edgerank’s rhetoric is not  just  imposed
discursively, but  also materially by the Facebook interface in which the
Edgerank algorithm operates. This interface is geared to speak to the
algorithm, which values ‘likes’ and ‘shares’. Edgerank is thus best  understood
as a rhetor that  operates both discursively and socio-technically. This is
explicated by the way Facebook posts are automat ically co-authored by
pieces of  computer code that  counts the number of  likes, comments and
shares that  a given post  has at t racted, and publishes these numbers as part
of  the post . The signif icance of  these numbers lies also in their computat ional
relat ionship with the Edgerank algorithm, which uses them to curate the news
feed.
As such, Edgerank dist ributes rhetorical power beyond the individual author of
Facebook posts to other users and computer code whose act ions ‘loop’
explicit ly back into Facebook posts33. The result  is that  the rhetorical
signif icance of  a Facebook post  lies as much in it s potential to create a new
audience and a new set t ing, as in the content  of  the original post34. Any post
on Facebook can become great  as long as it  generates relat ionships – edges
– that  propel it  to greatness in the world of  Edgerank. This puts pressure on
the just if iabilit y of  Edgerank in pract ice, because it s abilit y to generate a just
vision relies on qualif icat ions that  are generated automat ically. Here is a
potent ial break with the connect ionist  world and it s project  grammar, which
requires authent ic relat ionships (see below).
In order to explore this, we need to expand the empirical site to take into
account  the audience in f ront  of  which Edgerank was presented in 2010. While
the above analysis of  the Edgerank algorithm has explicated a great  deal, it
rests primarily on a formal depict ion of  the algorithm that  does not  tell us
much about  how it  is it s orderings are just if ied by actors pract ically involved in
the Edgerank world. As Mackenzie and Vurdubakis35 put  it , computer code is
of ten presented in a way that  ‘promises completeness and decidabilit y’, but  it
is full of  ambiguity in it s execut ion. Following Boltanski and Thévenot , the way
their abst ract  models of  moral grammars play out  is dif ferent  within each
moral grammar according to specif ic situat ions. Their advice is that  to get  a
more substant ial understanding of  just if icat ion pract ices, one has to take a
closer look at  specif ic moral grammars in specif ic situat ions.
Tensions in the world of  Edgerank
Following Boltanski and Thévenot , what  becomes important  are set t ings in
which the prudent  way of  act ing in the ‘world of  Edgerank’ is being explicated
to dif ferent  degrees. The Facebook marketers, to whom the Edgerank
algorithm was presented in 2010, are worth consult ing here, because they hold
a concrete interest  in understanding how to make themselves relevant  in the
world of  Edgerank: For them, the algorithmically ordered news feed is the key
to gaining exposure for the brands they do market ing for. The main source of
the relat ive fame of  Edgerank is exact ly the at tent ion paid to it  by internet
marketers, who care about  whether Facebook posts made by corporate
Facebook pages show up in the news feeds of  users. People calling
themselves social media marketers produce a wealth of  blog posts about  this
issue, including many references to Edgerank, as a Google web search on the
term test if ies to36. Their considerat ions can be read as not  only about  how to
live with Facebook, but  more specif ically as allowing us to glimpse into the
pract ical wisdom, or prudence, of  the Edgerank world37.
The Edgerank grammar that  we f leshed out  above of fers a standardizat ion of
engagement  that  makes it  possible for algorithmic calculat ions to be
posit ioned as the proper form of  evidence. However, the qualit ies of
standardizat ion, experimentat ion and opt imizat ion have st rong connect ions
to the indust rial grammar, which was precisely the main antagonist  for the
management  literature that  Boltanski and Chiapello read as appealing to a
new project ive grammar. In this literature, the key was to move away f rom
standardized and st ructured work relat ion with predef ined object ives38. As
opposed to this indust rial world, the project ive grammar lends people to
‘organize themselves and invent  local rules that  are not  amenable to
totalizat ion and comprehensive rat ionalizat ion by some putat ive organizat ion
department ’39. What  the above analysis ended up indicat ing is that  this
tension might  be an important  part  of  living with Edgerank, because both
personal engagement  and standardizat ion plays key roles in the world of
Edgerank.
This tension can be explored further by invest igat ing how engagement  it self
is being problemat ized by actors in their quest  for f inding prudent  ways of
act ing in accordance with the moral grammar of  Edgerank. For some
Facebook marketers, it  turns out  that  knowing the Edgerank formula can in
fact  be misleading, because they f ind that  there is no inst rumental
mathemat ical solut ion to success on Facebook. As one ‘social media
corporate community manager’ puts it  in the concluding sect ion of  a blog post
called Show Up In The Facebook News Feed! 8 Things That Really Work:
‘Put  people f irst . While understanding how the News Feed works is
important , what ’s most  important  is that  you’re put t ing the needs,
interests, and expectat ions of  your audience f irst . Af ter all, social
media is about  connect ing with your audience and building
relat ionships with the people who mat ter most . Focus on creat ing
content  that ’s relevant  to them and you won’t  have any problem
get t ing not iced in the News Feed.’40
The quote downplays the importance of  knowing the details of  the Edgerank
algorithm, because what  is really important  is to produce relevant  content  for
the ‘people who mat ter most ’.
Drawing on the work of  Boltanski and Chiapello, this is a good example of  how
business advice can be read as more than a recipe for product ivit y, because
it  ‘simultaneously has a high moral tone, if  only because it  is a normat ive
lit erature stat ing what  should be the case, not  what  is the case’41. In this
case, the quote suggests that  what  should be rewarded on social media is
connecting in relevant ways.
This points to a qualif icat ion of  engagement  that  is also built  into Edgerank: A
like is not  valued as highly as a comment  in terms of  depth of  engagement , so
what  becomes important  is to connect  in a genuine way that  sparks
interact ion in the sense of  meaningful dialogue rather than t rying to ‘game’
the algorithm with a high quant it y of  likes. Another social media marketer
makes this point  remarkably clear when she explicit ly emphasizes the need to
‘stop chasing algorithms’42. Instead, she argues, posts made by commercial
brands have to be t ruly engaging to work:
‘If  you make a customer like your Facebook page to get  a discount
code, or retweet  a tweet  to enter a contest , all you’ve learned is
that  they wanted whatever was on the other side of  that
interact ion. You didn’t  of fer them content  that  engaged them on
any kind of  personal or emot ional or intellectual level, you haven’t
reinforced a signif icant  aspect  of  your brand story for them,
you’ve just  dangled a carrot  in f ront  of  them and got ten exact ly
the predictable react ion anyone could have expected.’ 43
The marketer’s advice is that  the key to calculat ive success in relat ion to the
Edgerank algorithm and similar social media logics is in fact  to take a non-
calculat ive approach. The social media market ing business might  seem to be
about  how to lure people into feeling engaged, but  in fact  there is no way to
buy people’s engagement . You have to appeal to them on a ‘personal or
emot ional or intellectual level’. In fact , you have to be genuinely engaged
yourself  in order to engage other people through social media. What  might  on
the surface appear to be a meaningless business, is in fact  meaningful and
excit ing for the people doing it . As the marketer states in the beginning of  the
same blog post :
‘I love social media. This, I’m sure, isn’t  surprising given what  I do
for a living and the things I write about , but  I really do love it .’ 44
The two quotes f rom the blog post  by Huber show that  in this situat ion,
Edgerank’s principle of  engagement  t ranscends it self  and is used as a source
of  crit icism of  Edgerank it self . Prudent  act ion in the world of  Edgerank then
means to ref rain f rom focusing on the algorithm and pursue engagement  in a
qualitat ive rather than quant itat ive way. This points to a tension between
automat ion and the ‘authent icit y’ requested by the bloggers, but  it  also shows
how Edgerank can be just if ied: It  is seen as rewarding behavior that  is not
st rategic and based on specialized knowledge of  the algorithm. This is how
‘superior beings’ (in this case, those with a lot  of  recent engagement) can just if y
their advantageous posit ion in f ront  of  ‘inferior beings’ in the Edgerank world.
The superior being creates content  that  engages it s viewers and make them
want  to share, like and comment . As noted above, this is a world that  only
exists through engagement . One consequence of  this is that  the superior
being also makes life worth living for the inferior being through his/her abilit y to
engage others.
Further cont ribut ing to just if ying this principle of  equivalence is the idea that
‘you are only as great  as your last  post ’ (and the engagement  it  generated),
which means that  anyone can in principle become great  persons as long as
they make themselves relevant  to those they want  to impress. These means
of  just if icat ion help explain how the marketer is able to begin her blog post  by
emphasizing that  opt imizing the presence of  a brand in the Facebook news
feed is about  meaning, and something that  one can love to have as a job.
These observat ions of  the pract ical wisdom, or prudence, of  actors with
experience in the world of  Edgerank conf irms Boltanski and Thévenot ’s
recommendat ion that  we should not  draw too st rong a cont rast  between
Edgerank as the creat ive rhetor and the users as a passive recept ive
audience. Rather, as Zulick notes, we should t reat  the creat ion of  form and
the recognit ion of  form as the same creat ive act . That  is, both the Edgerank
algorithm and the user needs to invent  and re-invent  the dwelling place wherein
the grammar of  Edgerank is just if iable, a process which is at  once ethical and
aesthet ical45.
The quest ion raised by these observat ions about  the tension between
automat ion and authent icit y in pract ice raises the quest ion of  why it  is fair to
use an algorithm at  all. If  personal intuit ion and meaningfulness is so cent ral
for determining relevance on Facebook, why rely on algorithms to scan and
quant if y your social milieu, and order it  in a hierarchical fashion? Why not  st ick
to the local, int imate and authent ic connect ions valued by the project ive
grammar?
Automated ordering for authentic engagement
The explicat ion of  the tension between authent icit y and automat ion in the
world of  Edgerank leaves us with the more general quest ion of  how normat ive
expectat ions and resources shif t  when the connect ionist  world is explicit ly
facilitated by algorithms. Following Boltanski and Chiapello’s work on the
genesis of  the project ive regime, what  is at  stake here is not  just  a sof tware
studies interest  in how algorithms mediate and order social relat ions and
informat ion. This part icular rhetorical analysis implies that  what  is at  stake is
also the discursive and socio-technical scaf folding of  new commonplaces. In
other words, there is a quest ion of  how algorithms become part  of  the
const ruct ion of  a just , edge-ranked public.
Boltanski and Chiapello are aware of  two dominant  ways of  conceiving a
network. In the f irst , networks are part  of  the personal search for meaning
through engagement  with others46. In the second, the network is conceived as
a system and judged and acted on in it s totalit y. With Boltanski and Chiapello,
only the f irst  concept ion is understood as able to appeal to our moral sense,
which means that  the computat ional aspect  has to be subordinated to as
something that  facilitate contacts and not  something that  explicit ly judges
them.
Edgerank’s abilit y to judge thus also marks a potent ial boundary of  Edgerank’s
capabilit ies as rhetor. Following James J. Brown, the standardizing work done
by Edgerank has the robot ic and procedural features that  qualif y it  as a ‘robot
rhetor,’ which takes a certain ‘input , applies procedures, and generates
output ’47. However, Boltanski and Thévenot ’s model assumes a moral sense
which gives any rhetor the abilit y to comply with situat ions in a natural way,
which is the abilit y to use the adequate principles of  just ice in a given
situat ion48. In the f irst  instance this focus on the moral sense of  human actors
seems to mark of f  the Edgerank algorithm as incapable of  guiding the
organizat ion of  a just  public.
But  in the second instance, Edgerank creates the realit y in which it s moral
grammar is appropriate. So perhaps Edgerank does not  have a situat ional
sense of  what  is natural, but  it  does have a ‘generat ive’ capacity to create
the situat ion it  needs to seem morally adequate49. While the algorithm might
rely on automat ion, this automat ion is posit ioned by Facebook as a t imely
response to changes within the network world, where the proliferat ions of
relat ions and exponent ial growth in potent ially relevant  connect ions has
necessitated automated calculat ions of  relevancies. The argument  can be
found in one of  Facebook’s patents, ent it led Generating a feed of stories
personalized for members of a social network:
‘As social networking has grown more popular, the informat ion
available to each member has become voluminous. Accordingly,
members may be inundated with informat ion that  does not
interest  the members. Further, members may f ind themselves
unable to f ind in a t imely and ef f icient  manner the informat ion that
does interest  them, such as informat ion about  their f riends and
their community. There is therefore a need for systems and
methods for generat ing dynamic relat ionship-based content
personalized for members of  a web-based social network.’50
According to this argumentat ion, Edgerank maintains a special abilit y to take
care of  current  events exact ly because it  automates what  we might  call
connect ionist  evaluat ions. The patent  can be read as adding an important
specif icat ion to the world of  Edgerank, because it  sees the standardized and
automated ordering of  social relat ions as associated with an enhancement
rather than a loss of  meaning. While risking denunciat ion as being inauthent ic,
engagement  through Edgerank allows for t ime-ef f icient  and thus f lexible
engagement  in a vast  number of  projects, including the potent ial of  engaging
in projects that  would not  have been visible without  the algorithm.
This quest  for meaningful navigat ion of  digital social networks has a human
actor at  it s center that , as we have shown throughout  the paper, constant ly
tests the fairness of  Edgerank’s orderings. This dependency on the part icular
user in the ‘edge-ranked public’ creates a constant  feedback loop between
the more quant itat ive calculat ion of  relevance produced by the algorithm and
the qualitat ive valuat ion of  the Edgerank results by the user. There is a double
vision at  play that  is interdependent , and whose two parts both can be used
to crit ique the other. The user can reject  Edgerank’s orderings as irrelevant ,
inauthent ic noise and ret reat  to person-to-person communicat ion channels.
On the other hand, the Edgerank algorithm can make person-to-person
communicat ion seem like an inef f icient  way to get  in contact  with what
engages you.
As such, Edgerank is it self  being judged on it s ‘abilit y to ext ract  meaning out
of  a constant  f low of  informat ion that  is of  interest ’51, and produce an
algorithmically generated f lows of  informat ion that  of fer specif ic ‘visions’ of
what  is of  importance in our environments52. By situat ing the Edgerank
algorithm in the crit ical situat ion of  informat ion overload, it  has become clear
that  it s orderings are never universally just if ied or complete unjust if ied.
Instead, Edgerank of fers a certain vision whose fairness is constant ly being
tested by it s users. These tests, however, do not  only come f rom moral
grammars that  are external to Edgerank, but  also rely on the very visions that
Edgerank produce. In this moral grammar, current  events are ordered
according to a principle where informat ion is fundamentally ‘social’ in the
sense of  always being qualif ied by subject -subject  relat ions, or recent
engagement.
Following Koed Madsen, such devices for algorithmic sense-making can have
an impact  on social inquiry ‘similar to the way cit y hall meet ings, focus groups
and surveys have shaped our approach to managing and organizing (…)
cont roversies during the last  decades’53. Coming back to Boltanski and
Thévenot , this ongoing development  of  the resources with which we just if y
our orderings of  crit ical situat ions needs our empirical at tent ion. The
explicat ion of  the edge-ranked public has the potent ial to open for new
crit iques (and thus new kinds of  just if icat ions) of  both the imperat ives of  the
network world and the role that  algorithms play in our everyday lives.
Conclusion
In this paper we have t ried to ‘think with the Edgerank algorithm’ and describe
how it  can be said to create a just  vision of  the world. We have proposed
analyzing it  as a rhetor that  explicates it s ordering rather than a power that
operates through the technologically unconscious. To do this we derived a
methodological st rategy f rom the work of  Boltanski and Thévenot , which
states that  one has to loyally deploy a world to be able to describe how a
certain vision, with it s sort ing of  the relevant  f rom the irrelevant , can be seen
not  only as useful but  also just . We therefore analyzed the Edgerank formula
as a world with specif ic beings and a specif ic moral grammar that  guides
prudent  act ion and is a resource for judgment . This was not  done by analyzing
the algorithm alone, but  also through paying at tent ion to how the algorithm is
appropriated, crit iqued and just if ied by various actors engaged with the
algorithm, something that  gave us a bet ter sense of  how the Edgerank
grammar is used to guide act ion and just if y a specif ic vision of  current  events
in the Facebook news feed.
We found that  prudent  act ion in the world of  Edgerank is to be authent ically
engaged and able to engage others. It  follows that  a cent ral tension in the
Edgerank grammar is that  between authent icit y and automat ion. The
automated calculat ion of  relevance is on the one hand necessary for users in
a world f illed with signals, and on the other hand always in danger of  f lat tening
the world to a point  where the user is unable to be af fected by it . This is a
problemat ic balance, since the Edgerank algorithm has to create a vision that
orders it s beings in accordance to what  will engage it s user. If  it  fails this test ,
it  has not  produced a just  vision, according to it s own principles. The tension
shows how the engagement -oriented moral grammar that  Edgerank enacts
and draws upon to just if y it s own ordering also t ranscends it  and can in turn be
used to crit ique it .
Understood in this way, algorithms like Edgerank no longer appear as vessels
of  hidden power or exploitat ion, but  as explicit  at tempts at  envisioning the
just  public. Rather than having to wait  for social scient ists to reveal and
crit ique the polit ical philosophy of  Edgerank, the moral grammar of  Edgerank
becomes a source of  situated crit icism of  the Edgerank algorithm it self . This
argument  certainly overplays the extent  to which Edgerank is an explicated
polit ical philosophical const ruct , but  this seems necessary to fully deploy and
give shape to the edge-ranked public, something we think is of  crit ical
importance in a t ime when personalized automated algorithms are cent ral
agents in the const ruct ion of  our polit ical associat ions.
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